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EMPLOYEE VOICE, HUMAN RESOURCE
PRACTICES, AND QUIT RATES:  EVIDENCE
FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
ROSEMARY BATT, ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, and JEFFREY KEEFE*
The authors draw on strategic human resource and industrial relations
theories to identify the sets of employee voice mechanisms and human resource
practices that are likely to predict firm-level quit rates, then empirically evaluate
the predictive power of these variables using data from a 1998 establishment-
level survey in the telecommunications industry.  With respect to alternative
voice mechanisms, they find that union representation predicts lower quit rates,
even after they control for compensation and a wide range of other human
resource practices that may be affected by collective bargaining.  Also predicting
lower quit rates is employee participation in offline problem-solving groups and
in self-directed teams.  No apparent association is found between quit rates and
the availability of nonunion dispute resolution procedures. Regarding human
resource practices, higher relative wages and internal promotion policies pre-
dict lower quit rates, and contingent staffing, electronic monitoring, and vari-
able pay predict higher rates.
*Rosemary Batt is Associate Professor of Human
Resource Studies, Industrial and Labor Relations
School, Cornell University; Alexander J.S. Colvin is
Assistant Professor of Labor Studies and Industrial
Relations, Pennsylvania State University; and Jeffrey
Keefe is Associate Professor, School of Management
and Labor Relations, Rutgers University.  This re-
search is based on a multi-year study of the telecom-
munications services industry conducted in collabo-
ration with Harry Katz and generously funded by the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.  The authors thank Harry
Katz for comments on prior versions of the draft and
Danielle van Jaarsveld for her careful research assis-
tance.
A data appendix with additional results, and cop-
ies of the computer programs used to generate the
results presented in the paper, are available from the
first author at the New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, 387B Ives Hall, Cornell Univer-
sity, Ithaca, NY 14853.
igh quit rates are a significant cost to
organizations, both because they raise
labor costs (Oi 1962) and because they
lower organizational performance (for ex-
ample, Norsworthy and Zabala 1986).  Re-
search in industrial relations has shown
that unionized establishments have signifi-
cantly lower quit rates than nonunion es-
tablishments because they provide a voice
mechanism through which employees can
negotiate higher relative compensation and
redress problems as an alternative to exit
(Freeman and Medoff 1984).  More recent
research on “high commitment” or “high
performance” work systems has shown that
coherent sets of human resource practices
lead to lower quit rates (for example, Arthur
1994) and better organizational perfor-
mance (for example, Ichniowski et al. 1996),
and that high quit rates undermine perfor-
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mance (Alexander, Bloom, and Nuchols
1994; Huselid 1995).  High performance
practices include those that invest in the
skills of the work force and provide the
opportunity and incentives for employees
to use those skills effectively (for example,
Appelbaum et al. 2000).
Over the past decade or so, however,
firms have adopted a wide range of non-
union voice mechanisms and cost-cutting
human resource practices that have not
been considered in the industrial relations
or high performance literature.  Alterna-
tive voice mechanisms include different
types of nonunion dispute resolution pro-
cedures as well as team-based work organi-
zation.  Cost-cutting human resource (HR)
practices include downsizing and contin-
gent staffing and pay, which are likely to
decrease employee commitment to the firm.
In this study, we examine a comprehen-
sive set of voice and human resource prac-
tices that are likely to influence employee
quit rates.  We consider quit rates at the
establishment level rather than at the indi-
vidual level of analysis so that we can iden-
tify the specific management practices that
influence quit rates—a subject of particu-
lar interest in periods of tight labor mar-
kets.  In contrast to the high performance
literature, which generally examines clus-
ters of HR practices taken together, we
examine individual practices in order to
disaggregate the unique and potentially
contradictory relationships between spe-
cific management practices and quit rates.
We consider these issues among a relatively
under-studied group of workers:  moder-
ately and highly skilled service, sales, and
technical employees.  To do so, we examine
a unique 1998 data set on a nationally rep-
resentative sample of union and nonunion
establishments in the telecommunications
industry.
Voice Mechanisms as
Deterrents to Turnover
The exit-voice framework (Hirschman
1970) identifies a range of circumstances
in which markets may fail to provide orga-
nizations with effective feedback and in
which customer or employee voice might
lead to improved organizational perfor-
mance.  Voice, as defined by Hirschman, is
any attempt to change rather than escape
from an unsatisfactory situation.  In the
employment context, voice involves the
expression of dissatisfaction by employees;
exit occurs when employees quit.  The de-
sign of work and human resource practices
is likely to influence the balance between
employee voice and exit.  The exit-voice
framework provides a model of the politi-
cal economy of organizations, where exit
belongs to the realm of economics and
voice to the realm of politics.
In recent years, employers have adopted
alternative forms of voice, both as part of
high performance work systems and as sub-
stitutes for unions.  Employers have viewed
team-based work systems as providing op-
portunities for collective voice or direct
participation in shop-floor decisions, and
nonunion dispute resolution procedures
as providing opportunities for individual
voice to redress employee grievances.  In
the following sections, we consider the theo-
retical importance of these alternative
mechanisms as predictors of quit rates.
Unions as Collective Voice
In the most important application of the
exit-voice model to employment, Freeman
and Medoff (1984) provided evidence link-
ing union voice to higher productivity and
lower quit rates.  Unions reduce the prob-
ability that workers will quit their jobs for
two fundamental reasons.  First, unions
provide a voice mechanism through which
workers gain higher compensation than
they could earn in a similar nonunion job.
Second, unions provide workers with a voice
in determining an array of other rules and
conditions of work, including policies that
reduce pay inequality, grievance and arbi-
tration procedures for appealing manage-
rial decisions, “just cause” for discipline
and discharge, and seniority clauses de-
sired by workers.
Empirical research supports the view that
union mechanisms affecting both wages
and voice lead to lower quit rates in union
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establishments.  Freeman (1980a), for ex-
ample, found that union establishments
had lower quit rates even when his analysis
controlled for wage rates.  Other research-
ers have replicated this finding in the United
States (for example, see Cotton and Tuttle
1986; Wilson and Peel 1991) as well as in
other countries (Miller and Mulvey 1991;
Lincoln and Kalleberg 1996).
Recent research, however, has chal-
lenged this general view.  In a study of
truckers in the 1990s, for example, Delery
et al. (2000) found that the statistically sig-
nificant relationship between quit rates and
unionization disappeared when wages and
benefits were taken into account.  They con-
cluded that the union effect operated en-
tirely through compensation.  They sug-
gested that union decline may be affecting
unions’ ability to influence employee voice
and quit behavior, but they admitted that
their findings are industry-specific and
could be accounted for by the independent
nature of truck drivers’ jobs and their greater
attachment to their occupation than to their
employers.  Thus, Delery et al. (2000) re-
open the union voice debate by question-
ing whether unions in the 1990s were strong
or effective enough as voice mechanisms to
influence employee quit behavior.
Another stream of recent research has
found that at the individual level, employee
use of voice mechanisms is positively, not
negatively, correlated with employee in-
tent to quit and subsequent turnover (Lewin
and Boroff 1996; Boroff and Lewin 1997;
Lewin and Peterson 1999).  This latter body
of research suggests a distinction not rec-
ognized in much of the standard exit-voice
theory:  whereas quit rates may be lower in
enterprises where stronger voice mecha-
nisms are available, among enterprises that
have similar voice mechanisms available to
employees, greater usage of these voice
mechanisms may be associated with higher
quit rates.
Teams as Collective Voice
In the high performance literature, team-
based work systems generally are viewed as
improving performance by providing work-
ers (those closest to the point of produc-
tion) with the opportunity to collaborate in
solving problems and improving the pro-
duction process.  Much less attention has
been paid to teams as voice mechanisms
that allow dissatisfied workers to voice their
concerns, and thereby reduce the likeli-
hood that they will quit.  Those studies that
have found an inverse relationship between
high performance practices and quit rates
have included team participation only as
part of a cluster of practices (for example,
Arthur 1994; Huselid 1995).  Other studies
that have examined individual HR prac-
tices and quit rates have found mixed re-
sults.  For example, Delery et al. (2000)
found no relationship between employee
participation and quit rates in the trucking
industry (see also Shaw et al. 1998).
A large body of research in organiza-
tional behavior, however, has found that
employees with “enhanced or enriched
jobs” (for example, those with greater au-
tonomy, variety, or ability to complete a
whole task) have higher job satisfaction
and lower turnover (Hackman and Oldham
1980; McEvoy and Cascio 1985; Cotton and
Tuttle 1986; Hom and Griffeth 1995).  The
question, therefore, is whether the oppor-
tunity for voice provided by different types
of team formations is sufficient to reduce
the propensity to quit.  If teams are merely
supervised groups with little discretion to
affect conditions at work, then their influ-
ence on quits will be minimal.
In general, researchers have distin-
guished between two types of team partici-
pation:  consultative and substantive (Levine
and Tyson 1990).  Consultative forms in-
clude participation in problem-solving
groups that meet periodically and allow
employees to voice their opinions to man-
agement.  Substantive forms include the
organization of work into self-managed or
semi-autonomous teams that have consid-
erable responsibility for making day-to-day
decisions without consulting management.
Empirical research in the teams or group
effectiveness literature provides mixed re-
sults on whether these different forms of
team voice lower turnover.  Consultative
forms have a significant but modest posi-
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tive relationship to employee behavior and
performance (Cotton 1993; Cohen and
Bailey 1997).  Substantive participation in
self-managed teams has a significant, and
appreciably greater, positive relationship
to a range of employee behaviors and per-
formance, but specific studies of turnover
have yielded mixed results.  For example,
Cordery et al. (1991) found that autono-
mous teams have higher turnover rates than
non-autonomous teams.  Weisman et al.
(1993) found that nurses in self-managed
teams worked longer hours (increasing
turnover), but had higher pay (decreasing
turnover).  Other studies have found that
alternative forms of voice can reduce em-
ployee turnover (Bemmels 1997).  For ex-
ample, Spencer (1986) found a negative
relationship between turnover rates and
number of voice mechanisms (such as griev-
ance procedures, survey feedback, and sug-
gestion systems).  In sum, theory suggests
that team participation programs may pro-
vide employees with enough voice to re-
duce turnover, but the research record is
mixed.
Nonunion Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Employee
Voice or Voice Suppression?
Employers also have designed a variety
of dispute resolution procedures in non-
union settings, including procedures for
management review of grievances, peer
review, and nonunion arbitration, that may
provide an individualized form of voice in
the workplace and thereby reduce quit rates.
There is no empirical research on the rela-
tive effectiveness of these alternative proce-
dures for reducing quit rates, but studies of
variation in union grievance procedures
have found that procedures providing rela-
tively stronger protections for workers are
associated with lower quit rates.  Rees
(1991), for example, examined collectively
bargained grievance procedures and found
that relatively stronger procedures more
effectively reduced quit rates than did
weaker procedures.  In Delery et al.’s truck-
ing study (2000), formal grievance proce-
dures were negatively related to quit rates,
but the relationship became statistically
insignificant in regression equations that
controlled for unionization.  Their mea-
sure of grievance procedures, however, did
not distinguish between weaker and stron-
ger forms of procedures.  We seek to under-
stand which types of nonunion dispute pro-
cedures provide workers with enough voice
to reduce quit rates.
Many nonunion dispute resolution pro-
cedures provide a formal structure through
which employees can appeal disputes with
supervisors to higher levels of management.
These may range from simple procedures
in which an individual manager reviews
written complaints to more elaborate pro-
cedures involving hearings of complaints
before appeal boards composed of senior-
level managers.  Under these types of non-
union procedures, managers hold decision-
making authority (Ewing 1989; Feuille and
Delaney 1992).  Under peer review proce-
dures, by contrast, employee complaints
are evaluated by a panel composed pre-
dominantly of the complainant’s peers.
Presumably, employees are more willing to
trust the effectiveness of a procedure in
which their fellow employees decide griev-
ances (Ewing 1989; Colvin 1999).  How-
ever, as employees of the company, peer
review panelists are not comparable to third
party neutrals used in arbitration or media-
tion procedures.  Also, peer review deci-
sions lack the legal enforceability of union
grievance-arbitration procedures, and thus
depend on the good faith of management.
Nonunion arbitration emerged during
the 1990s as the most prominent and rap-
idly expanding variety of nonunion dispute
resolution procedure using non-manage-
rial decision-makers.  An important danger
posed by these individual employee arbi-
tration agreements is their potential to sup-
press employee voice.  In Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the
Supreme Court deferred to employer-spon-
sored arbitration procedures to resolve dis-
putes over statutory rights.  Individual em-
ployee arbitration contracts often are com-
pulsory because employees must agree to
arbitration as a condition of employment at
the time of hire or, in some instances, as a
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condition of continuing employment or
future promotions or benefits (Stone 1996,
1999).  They require that an employee sub-
mit any alleged violation of state or federal
law to a company-designed arbitration pro-
cedure.  By agreeing to arbitration, the
employee forgoes any opportunity to pur-
sue his or her claim in court.  Both the
design of nonunion arbitration procedures
and the decisions of arbitrators are heavily
insulated from judicial review (Stone 1996,
1999).  Whether this innovation enhances
or suppresses employee voice is at the cen-
ter of a major controversy.  Some observers
suggest that compulsory arbitration creates
opportunities for due process in nonunion
workplaces (Zack 1999), while others sug-
gest it represents a significant curtailment
of employee rights (Stone 1996, 1999).
Current research suggests that the more
effective employees perceive the grievance
procedure to be, the more likely they will
exercise the voice option rather than quit
(Boroff and Lewin 1997).  If employees
perceive nonunion arbitration to be di-
rected primarily at limiting their statutory
employment rights, they may be less likely
to use these procedures as mechanisms for
voice and more likely to quit.
Predictions about the relationship be-
tween dispute resolution procedure usage
rates and employee quit rates are uncer-
tain.  Higher usage rates may indicate that
employees view nonunion procedures as
effective voice mechanisms.  If so, then we
would expect higher usage rates to be asso-
ciated with lower quit rates.  However, ex-
tensive research on unionized workplaces
indicates that higher grievance rates are
associated with higher levels of workplace
conflict and reduced organizational per-
formance (Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille 1983;
Katz, Kochan, and Weber 1985; Norsworthy
and Zabala 1986; Ichniowski 1986; Cutcher-
Gershenfeld 1991).  These higher levels of
workplace conflict associated with higher
grievance rates also may raise quit rates.  A
positive relationship between grievance
rates and quit rates is also suggested by
research indicating that individuals who
file grievances are more likely to quit than
are other employees (Lewin 1987; Lewin
1990; Lewin and Peterson 1999).  These
individual-level studies have focused pri-
marily on variation in usage of voice mecha-
nisms, rather than on variation in the pres-
ence of voice mechanisms.  This is in part
because previous research has concentrated
on unionized workplaces, which have less
variation in grievance procedures than
nonunion workplaces do, and hence has
not examined the effect of simultaneous
variation in both the type of procedure and
the usage or dispute rate (Lewin 1999).
The greater variation in the incidence and
structure of dispute resolution procedures
in the nonunion sector (Feuille and Delaney
1992; Colvin 1999) permits examination of
the question of how variation both in the
type of dispute resolution procedure and
in dispute rates affects aggregate quit rates.
Our prediction is that greater availability of
dispute resolution procedures to employ-
ees should be associated with lower quit
rates, but that, holding the availability of
procedures constant, higher grievance rates
should be associated with higher quit rates.
Human Resource
Practices and Quit Rates
Historically, the design of internal labor
markets encouraged long-term employ-
ment, fostered by a set of interrelated hu-
man resource policies designed to reduce
quit rates (Doeringer and Piore 1971;
Schacht 1985; Jacoby 1985).  Internal lad-
ders provided a series of promotional steps
that continually expanded the employees’
firm-specific skill sets and rewarded them
with higher pay at each step.  In exchange,
employers gained a loyal and stable work
force with high levels of firm-specific skills,
amortizing the quasi-fixed cost of employ-
ment over many years of employee tenure.
The high performance literature draws
heavily on internal labor market theory
(emphasizing investment in skills and train-
ing and long-term employment relations);
but it also includes newer practices such as
teams and performance-based pay (for ex-
ample, Osterman 1994b).
Empirical research does show that com-
mitment-enhancing internal labor market
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practices reduce quit rates.  Firm-specific
training (Miller and Mulvey 1991) and
higher pay (Leonard 1987; Powell, Mont-
gomery, and Cosgrove 1994; Shaw et al.
1998; Delery et al. 2000) are associated with
lower quit rates.  Cappelli and Chauvin
(1991) found that wage premiums or high
unemployment in the outside market re-
sulted in greater reliance on grievance pro-
cedures—presumably because the exit al-
ternative was more costly.  Meta-analyses of
research in organizational behavior also
find support for internal labor market
theory (for example, Cotton and Tuttle
1986; Hom and Griffeth 1995:40), with
lower turnover among employees who are
satisfied with promotion opportunities,
perceive their employment to be secure, or
have higher relative pay or pay satisfaction.
Finally, studies of high performance sys-
tems have shown that turnover is lower in
workplaces that adopt a cluster of high
commitment practices (Arthur 1994;
Huselid 1995).
Over the last decade or so, however,
firms have been dismantling internal labor
markets (for example, Cappelli 1999;
Osterman 1999) in an attempt to enhance
labor flexibility or their ability to quickly
adjust labor costs to variation in product
market conditions.  The use of cost-cutting
HR practices (including downsizing, sub-
contracting and outsourcing, contingent
and part-time staffing, and contingent pay)
has introduced labor market competition
inside organizations.  The result is that
workplaces often have a mix of HR prac-
tices that provide contradictory incentives
to workers—commitment-enhancing invest-
ments in training on the one hand, but
greater reliance on contingent staffing and
pay, on the other.  This use of contradictory
HR practices is at odds with the concept of
coherence or “bundles” of consistent prac-
tices found in the high performance litera-
ture (MacDuffie 1995), and suggests that
HR practices must be examined individu-
ally rather than as clusters or bundles.
Some research is emerging that shows
the effects of cost-cutting HR practices on
the behavior of “core” employees—those
who are regular employees and critical to
the business enterprise.  Firms that
downsize, for example, often do so again
(for example, Wyatt 1993), and thereby
send a signal to their core employees that
future employment is insecure.  In response,
the more qualified or skilled employees
who have alternative employment opportu-
nities are likely to quit.  Use of contingent
and part-time employees may be used to
buffer core employees from job displace-
ment; but recent studies show that firms
often use contingent staffing as a cost-cut-
ting strategy (Houseman 2001).  In these
cases, firms send a signal to core employees
that their jobs are insecure because future
cost-cutting may lead to converting more
core jobs to contingent positions.  Again,
the more qualified or skilled employees are
likely to leave.  In the 1990s, firms often
downsized and withdrew employment secu-
rity commitments while simultaneously us-
ing more contingent staffing.
The availability of temporary workers as
substitutes for core employees also puts
downward pressure on the wages of incum-
bent employees.  Katz and Krueger (1999),
for example, in an analysis controlling for
unemployment, found that states with a
greater share of temporary help employ-
ment experienced lower wage growth.  They
argued that the growth of the temporary
help industry and other contingent arrange-
ments facilitated wage restraint by increas-
ing the ability of firms to locate substitute
workers.  Similarly, establishments that use
relatively large numbers of temporary work-
ers as substitutes for core employees,
thereby putting pressure on the core em-
ployees to accept wage restraint, may find
that the wages of core employees fall be-
hind those of competing employers in the
external labor market.  Thus, by using con-
tingent labor contracts to hold down labor
costs, employers unintentionally may be
facilitating the exit of their core employ-
ees.
In conjunction with downsizing and con-
tingent staffing, some employers have
sought to reduce labor costs by standardiz-
ing and simplifying job tasks.  This re-engi-
neering of tasks reduces training costs and
permits electronic monitoring that saves
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on supervision and surfaces performance
problems using objective measures.  In the
context of the telecommunications indus-
try in this study, advanced information sys-
tems have provided employers with a major
tool for labor cost reduction through task
standardization and continuous electronic
monitoring.  Prior research has demon-
strated that such standardization and sim-
plification of jobs and electronic monitor-
ing is associated with higher turnover (Wil-
son and Peel 1991; Carayon 1993; Shaw et
al. 1998).
The greater use of contingent pay may
accelerate quit rates because performance-
based pay plans increase the variability of
workers’ pay, and thus their financial un-
certainty.  Performance-based pay links
workers’ pay more closely to variability in
market conditions, over which workers have
little control.  Given the relatively risk-averse
preferences reflected in the pay plans bar-
gained by unions representing workers
(Freeman 1980b and 1982), it is unlikely
that variable pay plans have been intro-
duced at workers’ request.  Most workers
rely financially on their paycheck alone,
and lack other sources of income or a diver-
sified portfolio to hedge risk.  Moreover,
most variable pay plans are not accompa-
nied by a compensating wage increase for
the greater risk borne by workers.
Expected Findings
In summary, in this paper we present a
model of the predictors of quit rates that
includes alternative voice mechanisms and
alternative human resource practices (see
Figure 1).  We hypothesize that union pres-
ence will have a negative relationship with
quit rates, over and above the effects of the
union wage and other voice and human
resource practices.  We hypothesize that
the team-based voice mechanisms will be
modestly negatively related to quit rates.
The prediction for nonunion dispute reso-
lution procedures is uncertain, as they may
be designed to encourage or to suppress
employee voice.  More effective procedures
(for example, peer review panels) should
be able to reduce quit rates.  Holding the
procedure constant, high grievance activity
rates should be positively associated with
quit rates because they signal higher levels
of conflict and greater numbers of prob-
lems faced by employees in the workplace.
Finally, quit rates should be lower in
workplaces that increase the cost of exit
through commitment-enhancing human
resource practices such as investment in
training, internal mobility opportunities,
and high relative pay.  Quit rates should be
higher, by contrast, in workplaces that have
implemented cost-cutting human resource
practices—including downsizing, the use
of contingent staffing, job standardization
and electronic monitoring, and variable
pay—each of which signals a lack of em-
ployer commitment to employee welfare or
long-term employment relations.  We ex-
pect these relationships to hold after we
control for market, organizational, and
demographic characteristics, which we dis-
cuss in the methods section below.
Methods
Sample
The sample is a stratified random sample
drawn from the Dun and Bradstreet listing
of establishments.  Establishments were
stratified by size (10–99 employees, 100-
plus employees), by SIC code (4812, cellu-
lar; 4813, wireline; 4841, cable), and by
state location.  Sixty percent of the sample
is in the wireline segment, 15% in cable
television, 14.6% in cellular, and 6.9% in
Internet services.  All establishments with
more than 100 employees were sampled so
that the survey would cover a large percent-
age of the industry’s work force.  Sampling
of the remaining smaller establishments
was done so that the total sample reflects
the relative proportion of establishments
in each industry segment of the Dun and
Bradstreet listing.  Because Internet service
providers (ISPs) are new and not systemati-
cally captured by SIC code, additional ISPs
were identified through the Directory of
National Dial-up Providers and Area Codes
of Operation.
In the fall 1998, a university-based survey
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team administered an initial telephone sur-
vey covering questions related to basic in-
dustry characteristics, management strate-
gies, and work and human resource prac-
tices.  The general manager at each estab-
lishment was the respondent.  The tele-
phone interview averaged 52 minutes, and
yielded a 54% response rate with 636 us-
able surveys.  Respondents were asked if
they were willing to take part in an addi-
tional survey on dispute resolution proce-
dures.  This yielded a sample of 302 respon-
dents, divided about equally between the
two core sides of the business:  network
operations and service and sales.
Measures and Means
We used several techniques to reduce
measurement problems found in workplace
studies.  Because human resource practices
vary by organizational unit and occupa-
tional subgroup (for example, Osterman
1987; Jackson et al. 1989), survey questions
asked managers about their “core” non-
management group of workers:  either net-
work technicians or service and sales work-
ers.  This strategy follows that of Osterman
(1994a), among others.  To reduce prob-
lems impairing validity, we used only gen-
eral managers as respondents, as some re-
search shows that general managers are less
optimistic than HR managers in their as-
sessments of HR practices (Gerhart 1999).
Moreover, general managers oversaw
worksites that were relatively small, with an
average of 117 core employees per site in
the database.
Another way to improve validity and reli-
ability is to base survey questions on field
research and to frame questions in lan-
guage that is context-specific.  We con-
ducted field research in numerous network
operations and service and sales centers in
a range of markets (local, long distance,
cellular, cable) and customer segments
(residential, small business, middle mar-
ket).  Our survey questions were based on
questions from our field interviews that
managers were readily able to answer with-
out consulting other documentation.  In
site visits, we checked these general manag-
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ers’ responses against those of subject mat-
ter experts in the same organization.  Also,
we checked the reliability of survey re-
sponses against outside data, including the
Dun and Bradstreet listing, union contracts
in specific companies, and the Current
Population Survey (CPS).1
The primary dependent variable in this
study is the current annual quit rate, based
on the question, “As a percentage, what is
your annual voluntary quit rate among [net-
work technicians or customer service and
sales employees] (excluding discharges,
retirements, transfers, and promotions)?”
This definition differs from definitions used
in most prior studies, which have collapsed
voluntary and involuntary turnover (for
example, Bennett et al. 1993; Alexander et
al. 1994; Arthur 1994; Huselid 1995).  It
follows the measure of quit rates used by
Wilson and Peel (1991), Powell et al. (1994),
and Shaw et al. (1998), the last of whom
showed that the determinants of discharges
and quits are distinct.  The independent
and control variables fall into four catego-
ries:  employee voice mechanisms; cost-
cutting human resource practices; commit-
ment-enhancing HR practices; and con-
trols for organizational and work force char-
acteristics.
Table 1 reports the means, standard de-
viations, number of observations, and
ranges for all variables used in the study.
The average annual quit rate in this sample
is 11%.  For collective voice, union pres-
ence is captured by a dummy variable
(where 1 = union, 0 = no union) because
the core work force is defined narrowly
enough to fall completely within one bar-
gaining unit.  Twenty-four percent of the
establishments are union-represented.  For
team participation, we measured consulta-
tive participation (whether the establish-
ment makes use of off-line problem-solving
groups) as the percentage of employees in
the establishment participating in prob-
lem-solving teams.  We measured substan-
tive participation (whether the establish-
ment makes use of self-directed teams) as
the proportion of the establishment’s em-
ployees organized in self-directed teams.
In the average establishment in this survey,
46% of employees were in problem-solving
groups and 19% were in self-directed work
teams.
Dispute resolution procedures covering
nonunion core work forces are captured by
three dummy variables representing, re-
spectively, any type of formal nonunion
grievance procedure, nonunion arbitration,
and peer review panels.  Usage of these
procedures is measured by a single variable
consisting of the annual number of griev-
ances or complaints per employee brought
under the applicable union or nonunion
procedure.  The average annual number of
disputes was six per 100 employees.  Due to
the length of the survey and its cost, only a
random subsample of 302 of the respon-
dents answered the more detailed set of
questions about their dispute resolution
procedures.
To capture cost-cutting human resource
practices,  we included five items:
downsizing, electronic monitoring, part-
time workers, temporary employees, and
variable pay.  Downsizing is measured by
taking the number of core employees dis-
placed in the past five years as a percentage
of the current core work force.  Market
deregulation, technology advances, and
mergers have led to ongoing downsizing
1First, we compared our survey items to data con-
tained in the Dun and Bradstreet listing.  There were
three variables (date establishment founded, primary
market, and size) common to both data sets, and the
means for each variable in the two data sets were not
statistically significantly different.  Second, we exam-
ined union contracts and found that the wage rates
and job titles reported by managers at specific Bell
companies were comparable to those in the corre-
sponding union contracts.  Third, we compared our
survey data to data in the Current Population Survey
for the telecommunications industry (CPS 1998).  For
example, for customer service and sales workers, the
most comparable group in the CPS is clerical and
sales workers.  The 1998 median annual pay in the
CPS is $31,200 for union clerical and sales workers
and $26,000 for nonunion workers, compared to
$33,000 for union workers and $28,000 in our sample.
The 1998 CPS unionization rate is 32%, while that of
our sample is 38%.  Given the fact that we over-
sampled large establishments that tend to pay higher
wages and to be more heavily unionized, these com-
parisons are reasonably consistent.
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and restructuring in this industry.  Elec-
tronic monitoring is the percentage of a
typical employee’s daily work time that is
electronically monitored; on average, this
value is 33%.  Contingent staffing includes
the percentage of the work force that is
temporary (on average, 4%) and part-time
(on average, 5%), as opposed to perma-
nent and full-time.  Variable pay is the
percentage of pay of the typical core em-
ployee that is variable—on average, 16%.
For commitment-enhancing HR prac-
tices, we measured three dimensions:  train-
ing, internal mobility opportunities, and
pay.  Training is the number of weeks of
training received by the typical core em-
ployee, which is two weeks on average in
this sample.  Our measure of internal mo-
bility opportunities is the percentage of
core employees who were promoted from
within the company or transferred from
other departments or business units within
Table 1.  Telecommunications Survey Data:
Means, Observations, Standard Deviations, and Ranges.
Variable Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Annual Quit Rate %a 598 0.108 0.164 0 1
Employee Voice
Union % 635 0.241 0.428 0 1
Teams:
Problem-Solving Groups % 632 0.462 0.385 0 1
Self-Directed Teams % 632 0.193 0.341 0 1
Dispute Resolution Procedures:
Any Nonunion Procedure % 300 0.357 0.480 0 1
Nonunion Arbitration % 291 0.162 0.369 0 1
Peer Review % 294 0.160 0.367 0 1
Dispute Rate per Employee 285 0.061 0.184 0 2
Cost-Cutting HR Practices
Downsizing Rate in Last Five Years % 633 0.092 0.011 0 0.261
Part-Time Workers % 630 0.053 0.135 0 1
Temporary Workers % 611 0.041 0.137 0 1
Electronic Monitoring % 622 0.326 0.405 0 1
Variable Pay % 616 0.158 0.530 0 1
Commitment-Enhancing HR Practices
Mobility % 611 0.438 0.367 0 1
Training (Days per Year) 636 2.025 1.652 0 10
Ratio:  Pay to Local Cost of Living 568 0.732 0.356 0.233 3.355
Control Variables
Female % 625 0.401 0.360 0 1
Ln of Establishment Employmentb 634 4.124 1.600 0 10.959
Branch % 636 0.794 0.405 0 1
Former Bell Company % 636 0.264 0.441 0 1
Human Resource Department % 633 0.428 0.495 0 1
College Graduates % 622 0.220 0.415 0 1
Field Technicians % 636 0.275 0.447 0 1
Office Technicians % 636 0.168 0.374 0 1
Service and Sales Workers % 636 0.557 0.497 0 1
aAll variables listed as % are scaled from 0 to 1 for consistency.  The mean for these variables should be
multiplied by 100 to get the actual percentage.
bEstablishment employment is defined as number of full-time, permanent employees; minimum log of
employment 0 because some establishments have only one full-time employee.
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the company; the average is 44%.  We in-
clude lateral as well as vertical opportuni-
ties because lateral opportunities often are
valued by employees—for example, for
moving to preferred jobs at the same pay,
for gaining broader experience for subse-
quent promotions, or for more convenient
work locations closer to home.  Pay is the
ratio of median pay to the local cost of
living.  Median pay (the pay received by the
typical core worker) was provided by survey
respondents.  We divided this pay level by
the local cost of living, drawn from the
Economic Research Institute’s (ERI’s) Geo-
graphic Reference Report, which provides cost
of living data for 3,568 North American
cities using the “Urban Family of Four”
model of analysis.  The average ratio of
worker pay to local cost of living ($35,040/
$48,000) is 0.73.
Four variables control for variation in
organizational characteristics:  size (the
natural log of the total number of employ-
ees—4.12, on average, across these estab-
lishments); branch location (whether the
establishment is part of a larger organiza-
tion—79%); Bell company (whether the
establishment is owned by a former Bell
company—26%); and presence of an HR
department at the establishment (43%).
Prior research has shown that these orga-
nizational characteristics are associated
with long-term employment contracts
(Rebitzer 1986; Osterman 1994a; Jacoby
1985).
We also controlled for human capital
characteristics that are known to influence
employees’ labor market power and exter-
nal opportunities.  Researchers, for ex-
ample, have found statistically significant
differences in employment tenure by gen-
der, although not when other factors such
as occupation or family status are taken
into consideration (Osterman 1987; Hom
and Griffeth 1995).  We measure female
composition as the percentage of the core
work force that is female, which is 40% on
average.  Education also has been found to
be associated with higher turnover (Hom
and Griffeth 1995:38).  In this study, we
included a dummy variable for college
(where 1 = college degree) because the
major educational dividing line is whether
employees have a college degree.  Twenty-
two percent of respondents reported that
the typical core employee has a college
degree.  Occupations are captured by a
series of three dummy variables:  whether
the employee is a service and sales repre-
sentative (the omitted category), an office
technician (17%), or a field technician
(28%).
Results
In this section, we first report the results
of our analysis of voice mechanisms and
human resource practices using the full
data set (Tables 2 and 3).  Then, because
the alternative dispute resolution variables
rely on a subset of the data, we report those
results separately (Table 4).
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix.
The union and team voice variables are
significantly correlated with lower quit rates,
but the nonunion procedures and dispute
rates are not.  Each of the cost-cutting
human resource practices, except electronic
monitoring, is associated with higher quit
rates.  Internal labor market practices that
are associated with lower quit rates at statis-
tically significant levels are internal mobil-
ity opportunities and high relative pay; train-
ing is not correlated with quits.  Some con-
trol variables have a statistically significant
positive association with higher quit rates,
including the percentage of the work force
that is female, having a human resource
department on site, and the percentage of
the work force with college degrees.  Other
controls, including the percentage of the
work force that is field technicians and
whether the establishment is part of a
former Bell company, are correlated with
lower quit rates.
Table 3 presents the results from Tobit
analyses in which the dependent variable is
regressed on four sets of independent vari-
ables:  employee (union and team) voice,
cost-cutting human resource practices, com-
mitment-enhancing HR practices, and the
full model, each with the appropriate con-
trols.  We used a Tobit procedure because
the dependent variable Quit Rate is trun-
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cated on the left end of the distribution at
zero (Maddala 1992)—no establishments,
obviously, have fewer than zero annual quits.
Tobit models correct for biasing in the
coefficient estimates due to the truncation
of the dependent variable; however, inter-
pretation of the coefficients also is differ-
ent under a Tobit model.  McDonald and
Moffit (1980) suggested a decomposition
of the Tobit coefficients into changes in the
probability of observing an outcome above
the left limit and changes in outcomes above
Table 2.  Telecommunications Survey Data:  Correlations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
  1 Quit Rate 1.000
  2 Union –0.244*** 1.000
  3 Problem-Solving Groups % –0.105** –0.253*** 1.000
  4 Self-Directed Teams % –0.104** –0.089* 0.261*** 1.000
  5 Downsizing in Last 5 Yrs. 0.202*** –0.038 0.046 –0.029 1.000
  6 Part-Time Workers % 0.266*** –0.150*** –0.026 0.009 0.101 1.000
  7 Electronic Monitoring % 0.060 0.164*** –0.002 0.026 –0.037 0.122*** 1.000
  8 Variable Pay % 0.131*** –0.251*** 0.166*** 0.062 0.015 0.039 –0.137*** 1.000
  9 Temporary Workers % 0.171*** –0.035 –0.017 0.036 –0.013 0.057 –0.046 –0.050
10 Mobility % –0.169*** 0.124*** –0.012 0.096** 0.048 –0.101** –0.053 –0.083*
11 Training –0.039 –0.010 0.116* 0.081** –0.045 –0.078* 0.035 0.110***
12 Pay to Cost of Living –0.140*** 0.035 0.072* 0.106** –0.069 –0.244*** –0.264*** 0.268***
13 Any Nonunion Procedure 0.076 –0.480*** 0.051 0.026 –0.021 0.011 –0.053 0.001
14 Nonunion Arbitration –0.018 –0.289*** 0.175*** 0.145** –0.050 –0.045 –0.066 0.076
15 Peer Review –0.033 –0.285*** 0.089 0.196*** 0.044 0.030 0.003 0.101
16 Dispute Rate per Employee 0.032 0.212*** –0.012 –0.066 0.004 –0.080 0.039 –0.106
17 Female % 0.160*** –0.091** 0.084** –0.101** 0.076* 0.204*** 0.179*** 0.103*
18 Ln Estab. Employment 0.003 0.353*** –0.205*** –0.140*** –0.078* –0.081** 0.238*** –0.147***
19 Branch –0.007 0.242*** –0.196*** –0.090** –0.081** –0.116*** 0.130*** –0.006
20 Former Bell Company –0.086** 0.567*** –0.175*** –0.069 0.051 –0.088** 0.109*** –0.099*
21 HR Dept. on Premise 0.109*** 0.115*** –0.069* –0.046 –0.048 0.023 0.248*** –0.056
22 College Graduate 0.084** –0.270*** 0.159*** 0.102** –0.028 –0.121*** –0.204*** 0.371***
23 Field Technicians –0.216*** 0.295*** –0.187*** –0.013 –0.028 –0.197*** –0.046 –0.231***
24 Office Technicians –0.054 –0.035 0.041 0.114*** –0.022 –0.073* –0.077 –0.122***
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
  9 Temporary Workers % 1.000
10 Mobility % –0.088* 1.000
11 Training –0.019 0.008 1.000
12 Pay to Cost of Living –0.047 0.068 0.064 1.000
13 Any Nonunion Procedure 0.000 0.018 0.001 –0.022 1.000
14 Nonunion Arbitration –0.053 0.073 0.171*** 0.028 0.269*** 1.000
15 Peer Review –0.094 0.050 0.128* 0.021 0.419*** 0.361*** 1.000
16 Dispute Rate 0.194*** –0.031 –0.025 –0.001 0.058 –0.077 –0.013 1.000
17 Female % –0.086* –0.188*** –0.006 –0.294*** 0.070 0.078 0.003 –0.105*
18 Ln Estab. Employment –0.067* 0.068* 0.017 0.028 –0.012 –0.097* –0.074 0.010
19 Branch 0.034 0.002 0.077* 0.118*** 0.014 –0.091 –0.089 0.123*
20 Former Bell Company –0.035 0.084* –0.038 0.088 –0.258*** –0.130* –0.168*** 0.106*
21 HR Dept. on Premise 0.063 0.005 0.022 –0.050 0.044 –0.047 –0.042 0.013*
22 College Graduates –0.020 –0.043 0.024 0.493*** 0.097* 0.046 0.093 –0.106*
23 Field Technicians 0.027 0.215*** –0.032 0.003 –0.083 –0.095 –0.034 0.097
24 Office Technicians 0.074* –0.010 0.053 0.109*** 0.006 0.023 0.025 0.085
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
17 Female % 1.000
18 Ln Estab. Employment 0.085* 1.000
19 Branch 0.048 0.333*** 1.000
20 Former Bell Company 0.037 0.280*** 0.288*** 1.000
21 HR Dept. on Premise 0.138*** 0.481*** 0.192*** 0.062 1.000
22 College Graduates –0.042 –0.095* –0.063 –0.043 –0.026 1.000
23 Field Technicians –0.576*** 0.120*** 0.105*** 0.078* –0.042 –0.305*** 1.000
24 Office Technicians –0.252*** –0.166*** –0.124*** –0.031 –0.058 0.079* –0.277*** 1.000
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
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the left limit.  The second part of this
decomposition represents the effect of
changes in the independent variables on
the dependent variable in the positive
range, which provides an interpretation
equivalent to OLS estimates for this range
of outcomes once the appropriate calcula-
tion of the decomposition is made.2  Esti-
mates of effect sizes reported here are based
on this second part of the decomposition
and provide an estimate of the expected
change in the observed values of the depen-
dent variable for a given change in an inde-
pendent variable.  Also, because quit rates
are measured as a proportion of the cur-
rent work force, the coefficients may be
interpreted, once multiplied by 100, as per-
centage point changes in the quit rate at-
tributable to the given independent vari-
able.
In the first Tobit equation in Table 3, we
analyze the effects on quit rates of the three
employee voice mechanisms.  Union repre-
sentation alone is associated with a reduc-
tion of 6.5 percentage points in the quit
rate (Tobit 1), which drops to a 4.9 percent-
age point reduction in the quit rate in the
full model (Tobit 4).  Quit rates are 3.9
percentage points lower in establishments
where the entire work force is in problem-
solving groups than in establishments with
no employees in problem-solving groups
(Tobit 1), and are 3.6 percentage points
lower in the full model (Tobit 4).  Self-
directed teams are only significant at the
10% level in equation (1), but are signifi-
cant at the 5% level in the full model, which
indicates quit rates are 2.5 percentage points
lower in establishments where the entire
work force is organized into self-directed
teams than in establishments with no em-
ployees in teams.
In the second equation (Tobit 2), we
analyze the relationship between cost-cut-
ting human resource practices and quit
rates.  Each of the five practices indepen-
dently is associated with increased quit rates.
An increase in the size of work force reduc-
tions equivalent to 1% of the current work
force is associated with an increase of 1.4
percentage points in the quit rate, accord-
ing to the results reported in equation (2);
this association rises in the full model to a
3.5 percentage point increase in the quit
rate.  Increasing the proportion of part-
timers by 10 percentage points is associated
with a 0.9 percentage point (Tobit 2) or 1.1
percentage point (Tobit 4) rise in the quit
rate for the core labor force.  Increasing
the proportion of temporary employees by
10 percentage points is associated with a
1.2 percentage point (Tobit 2) or 1.0 per-
centage point (Tobit 4) higher quit rate.
Electronic monitoring of the work force at
all times during the work day is associated
with a 2.1 percentage point higher quit rate
than for workers who are not electronically
monitored (Tobit 4).  Variable pay also is
associated with higher quit rates at a barely
significant α = 0.10 level in equation (2).  In
equation (4), however, it becomes signifi-
cant at the α = 0.01 level and indicates that
an increase in the portion of pay that is
variable by 10 percentage points would raise
the quit rate by 0.5 percentage points.
The third equation (Tobit 3) estimates
the relationship between the three com-
mitment-enhancing internal labor market
variables and quit rates.  Both internal
mobility opportunities and a higher ratio
of pay to the local cost of living significantly
reduce quit rates.  Training, by contrast, is
not associated with any statistically signifi-
cant difference in quits.  If the portion of
employees who have mobility opportuni-
ties within the organization increased by 10
percentage points, quit rates would be re-
duced in the range of 0.3 percentage points
(Tobit 3) to 0.2 percentage points (Tobit
4).  By increasing annual wages by $4,800
(adjusted to reflect local cost of living), an
establishment can reduce quit rates in the
2The adjustment based on the second term in the
McDonald and Moffit (1980) decomposition is calcu-
lated by multiplying the Tobit coefficients by
[1 – z∗f(z)/F(z)–f(z)2/F(z)2], where F(z) is the cumu-
lative normal distribution function associated with
the probability of cases being above the left limit; f(z),
the first derivative of F(z), is the unit normal density
associated with this probability; and z is the correspond-
ing z-score for this probability (see Roncek 1992).
586 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
range of 0.6 percentage points (Tobit 3) to
0.4 percentage points (Tobit 4).
In each of the models, some controls are
also statistically significant.  Establishments
that are larger are significantly more likely
to have higher quit rates.  With regard to
occupational characteristics, field techni-
cians and central office technicians are
considerably less likely to quit than are call
center workers in customer service and sales.
Finally, once occupational and other char-
acteristics are taken into account, the fe-
male composition of the work force be-
comes marginally significant and is nega-
tively associated with quits.
In analyses not shown, we controlled for
variation in industry segments (for example,
wireline, wireless, and internet services).
We also controlled for local labor markets,
because prior research has shown that
higher unemployment rates or alternative
opportunities in the external market are
negatively correlated with turnover (for
example, Hulin et al. 1985; Carsten and
Spector 1987; Gerhart 1990).  For each
establishment surveyed, we included the
average 1998 unemployment rate for the
county or city where the establishment is
located, based on the Local Area Unem-
ployment Statistics of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (http://stats.bls.gov.laumthd.
htm).  However, we found that including
these market measures had no statistically
significant effect and lowered the variance
explained, so we excluded them in our
final analyses.
Turning to the nonunion dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms, we noted that in the full
correlation matrix reported in Table 2,
none of the variables representing non-
union dispute resolution procedures and
dispute rates are significantly correlated
with the quit rate.  However, the full sample
includes observations from both union and
nonunion establishments.  Therefore, we
also investigated the possibility that estab-
lishments with nonunion arbitration and
peer review procedures have higher quit
rates than union establishments, but at the
same time lower quit rates than nonunion
establishments that lack these procedures.
Using a subsample consisting of only the
nonunion establishments, we found mar-
ginally significant negative correlations (p
< .10) between quit rates and the presence
of nonunion arbitration procedures, peer
review procedures, and the dispute rate.
To further investigate the relationship be-
tween nonunion dispute resolution proce-
dures and quit rates, we ran Tobit regres-
sions for the quit rate on our dispute reso-
lution variables, using the variables from
the full model in Table 3 as control vari-
ables.
Table 4 presents the findings from Tobit
regressions run on the subsample of re-
spondents who answered the more detailed
questions on dispute resolution procedures
and activity.  The focus of this analysis is on
the question of whether there is evidence
for lower quit rates for nonunion establish-
ments that have dispute resolution proce-
dures than for those lacking procedures.
Equation (5) presents the results for the
same variables as in the full model without
any dispute resolution variables included
to provide a basis for comparison.  The
smaller sample size used here reduces the
significance levels for some variables, but
the coefficient estimates in equation (5)
are generally similar to those for the full
sample, supporting the representativeness
of the subsample when compared to the
full sample.
In each of the other models in Table 4,
the quit rate is regressed on a series of
combinations of dispute resolution vari-
ables added to the set of independent vari-
ables from the full model presented in
Table 3.  In each of these models, the
procedure usage rate is included along with
the dummy variables representing the type
of dispute resolution procedure, so that we
are simultaneously accounting for the ef-
fects of the presence and usage of proce-
dures on quit rates.  The only dispute reso-
lution procedure type variable that reaches
conventional levels of statistical significance
in Table 4 is the variable representing the
presence of peer review procedures.  Nei-
ther the presence of any type of nonunion
procedure nor the inclusion of nonunion
arbitration procedures has a statistically
significant association with the quit rate in
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Table 3.  Predictors of Annual Quit Rates.
Variable Tobit 1 Tobit 2 Tobit 3 Tobit 4
Employee Voice
Union –0.152**** –0.114****
0.027 0.026
Problem-Solving Groups % –0.092*** –0.084***
0.023 0.024
Self-Directed Teams % –0.049* –0.058**
0.026 0.028
Cost-Cutting HR Practices
Downsizing in Last Five Years 3.267**** 8.088****
0.687 2.309
Part-Time Workers % 0.212*** 0.251***
0.074 0.079
Temporary Workers % 0.281**** 0.236****
0.058 0.059
Electronic Monitoring % 0.047** 0.050**
0.022 0.023
Variable Pay 0.066* 0.107***
0.036 0.036
Commitment-Enhancing HR Practices
Mobility % –0.073*** –0.040*
0.026 0.023
Training –0.006 –0.005
0.006 0.005
Pay to Local Cost of Living –0.152*** –0.102***
0.034 0.033
Control Variables
Female % –0.026 –0.030 –0.071* –0.067*
0.036 0.036 0.040 0.037
Ln of Estab. Employment 0.0130** 0.016** 0.010 0.020***
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Branch 0.025 0.033 0.051 0.022
0.023 0.023 0.025 0.024
Former Bell Company 0.014 –0.034* –0.027 0.017
0.024 0.020 0.022 0.023
Human Resource Department 0.046** 0.017 0.037* 0.025
0.019 0.020 0.021 0.020
College Graduates –0.011 0.009 0.059** 0.035
0.023 0.024 0.028 0.027
Field Technicians –0.121**** –0.134**** –0.148**** –0.111****
0.031 0.032 0.034 0.032
Office Technicians –0.063** –0.066** –0.078*** –0.040
0.028 0.029 0.031 0.029
Constant 0.105*** –0.024 0.199**** 0.124***
0.039 0.040 0.046 0.048
Observations 576 545 521 492
Likelihood Ratio Chi Square 113.150 124.560 84.340 173.120
Pseudo R Squared 0.674 0.767 0.509 1.303
Likelihood Ratio –27.3/4149 –18.91/1291 –40.62/8212 20/1309
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level; ****at the .001 level.
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any of the specifications in which they are
included.  Even in the case of peer review
procedures, significance is achieved only at
the p < .10 level in equation (8).
Thus we do not find strong evidence that
nonunion dispute resolution procedures
provide voice mechanisms that reduce quit
rates in comparison to establishments lack-
ing such procedures.  Higher dispute rates,
however, are significantly associated with
higher quit rates at the p < .05 level in all
specifications.  As discussed earlier, previ-
ous research on unionized workplaces
linked high grievance rates to heightened
levels of conflict and reduced organiza-
tional performance (Katz, Kochan, and
Table 4.  Dispute Resolution and Quit Rates.
Variable Tobit 5 Tobit 6 Tobit 7 Tobit 8 Tobit 9
Employee Voice
Any Nonunion Procedure –0.028 –0.011
0.027 0.028
Nonunion Arbitration –0.026 –0.012
0.033 0.035
Peer Review –0.059* –0.047
0.033 0.037
Annual Dispute Rate 0.139** 0.129** 0.138** 0.142**
0.057 0.056 0.056 0.057
Union –0.110*** –0.133**** –0.125*** –0.128**** –0.140****
0.034 0.040 0.037 0.036 0.041
Problem-Solving Groups % –0.028 –0.042 –0.042 –0.040 –0.043
0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033
Self-Directed Teams % –0.031 –0.022 –0.015 –0.012 –0.008
0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.037
Cost-Cutting HR Practices
Downsizing in Last Five Years 7.19*** 7.32*** 7.25*** 7.37*** 7.20***
2.24 2.38 2.42 2.38 2.42
Part-Time Workers % 0.071 0.091 0.050 0.089 0.052
0.118 0.118 0.128 0.118 0.129
Temporary Workers % 0.248*** 0.221*** 0.228*** 0.207** 0.214***
0.079 0.080 0.082 0.081 0.082
Electronic Monitoring % 0.028 0.032 0.030 0.035 0.034
0.029 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.030
Variable Pay 0.147*** 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.164*** 0.158***
0.054 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.057
Commitment-Enhancing HR Practices
Mobility % –0.035 –0.025 –0.027 –0.027 –0.026
0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033
Training –0.007 –0.007 –0.006 –0.006 –0.006
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Pay to Local Cost of Living –0.105** –0.103** –0.100** –0.102** –0.097**
0.044 0.045 0.046 0.045 0.046
Control Variables
Included, but not shown
Observations 253 243 238 241 237
Likelihood Ratio Chi Square 110.99 112.75 107.45 113.45 108.82
Pseudo R Squared 1.732 1.809 1.707 1.757 1.705
–2 Log Likelihood –46.907 –50.425 –44.490 –48.875 –45.012
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level; ****at the .001 level.
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Gobeille 1983; Katz, Kochan, and Weber
1985; Norsworthy and Zabala 1986;
Ichniowski 1986; Cutcher-Gershenfeld
1991).  This result supports that finding by
linking high dispute rates to higher quit
rates and extends it to include both non-
union and union workplaces.
Discussion
Our results indicate that union institu-
tions and managerial policies that facilitate
voice can significantly reduce exits.  Unions
have a strong influence on quit rates, de-
spite significant declines in union density
in this industry—from roughly two-thirds
of all employees in 1984 to one-third in
1998.  The inverse relationship between
unions and quit rates is statistically signifi-
cant even after we control for team-based
voice mechanisms, pay, and other human
resource practices that are affected by col-
lective bargaining.  These findings are in
contrast to those of Delery et al. (2000),
who found that the union effect on turn-
over in the trucking industry disappeared
when wages and benefits were taken into
account.  Participation in problem-solving
teams is negatively related to quit rates; and
participation in self-directed teams has a
smaller effect.  Union representation and
direct participation via shop-floor teams
may be viewed as complementary vehicles
for employee voice at work.  By contrast, we
found that nonunion dispute resolution
procedures, in some cases designed as an
alternative to union grievance procedures,
did not significantly reduce quit rates.  If
new workplace dispute resolution proce-
dures are going to help close the represen-
tation gap in nonunion workplaces, our
results suggest they will need to be some-
thing stronger than the present employer-
designed procedures.
It is useful to discuss the findings for
nonunion dispute procedures in the con-
text of the telecommunications industry,
which despite the decline in union density
remains more highly unionized than most
other industries in the country.  Prior re-
search suggests that firms adopt dispute
resolution procedures as a union avoid-
ance strategy (Colvin 1999).  To the degree
that this is true, we would expect nonunion
dispute resolution procedures to be par-
ticularly strong in this industry because the
threat of union organizing is high.  In addi-
tion, we examined stronger forms of non-
union procedures, including nonunion ar-
bitration and peer review panels.  Even with
this relatively favorable setting for non-
union procedures, we found no statistically
significant results for nonunion arbitration
procedures and only marginally significant
results for peer review procedures, which
were not robust with respect to alternative
specifications of the model.
One alternative explanation is that man-
agement may introduce some nonunion
procedures in response to high levels of
employee complaints in the workplace.  If
these complaints reflect high levels of work-
place conflict that are also associated with
higher quit rates, we might have an effect in
the opposite direction, reducing any nega-
tive relationship between procedure pres-
ence and quit rates.  Although we cannot
definitively exclude the possibility of this
reverse mechanism, our inclusion of the
dispute rate in all of the dispute resolution
equations helps control for the possibility
that some of the procedures were intro-
duced in response to high levels of work-
place conflict.
Finally, our results are strong and consis-
tent on the question of the relationship
between grievance rates and quit rates:
holding the type of procedure constant, we
find a positive relationship.  This result is
consistent with the findings of Lewin and
colleagues in union settings and indicates
that future research on dispute resolution
procedures needs to disaggregate the ef-
fects of the presence of dispute resolution
procedures and the usage of those same
procedures.  One should not make the
mistake of assuming that because the avail-
ability of voice mechanisms in the work-
place is associated with lower quit rates,
increased usage of these voice mechanisms
will be associated with lower quit rates;
indeed, our results suggest that the reverse
is true.
With respect to human resource prac-
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tices, our results show that internal mobil-
ity opportunities and higher wages are as-
sociated with lower quit rates, but cost-
cutting human resource practices that treat
labor as a variable cost and introduce labor
market competition into the workplace are
associated with higher employee quits.
Downsizing, contingent staffing, electronic
monitoring, and variable pay are signifi-
cantly associated with higher quit rates.
Ongoing downsizing creates uncertainty
and demoralization that often lead the most
qualified to obtain jobs elsewhere.  Higher
use of temporary workers may signal to
core employees that the employer has a
ready supply of substitute workers and is
not committed to long-term employment
contracts.  Greater reliance on electronic
monitoring also significantly drives em-
ployee quits because it signals mistrust and
creates more onerous working conditions.
Call center employees experience elec-
tronic monitoring as unremitting surveil-
lance of their work and personal activities,
including their use of the restroom.  Where
possible, they are likely to seek alternative
working conditions.
With respect to variable pay, some re-
search on high performance work systems
finds that variable pay clusters with teams
and investment in training in a bundle of
coherent practices.  By contrast, our results
indicate that variable pay plans are exit
drivers.  One explanation for these contra-
dictory findings is that in most of the high
performance literature, performance-based
pay is in the form of group incentives such
as gain-sharing or profit-sharing that are
added to base pay and that rarely exceed 5–
10% of total pay.  In our case, more than
half of variable pay is individual commis-
sion pay for service and sales workers, and
the mean percent of pay at risk is 27% (with
a range of variation between 0% and 100%).
Commissions are a type of piece rate
system whereby employees are directly com-
pensated for each item they sell.  While
some workers may thrive on risk and indi-
vidual competition and benefit through
higher earnings under these plans, prior
research suggests that most workers are
risk-averse.  Because most do not have di-
versified portfolios, they are likely to be
dissatisfied with the greater risk and earn-
ings volatility that are associated with vari-
able pay.  In addition, prior research shows
that piece rate systems are structured as
prisoner dilemma games (see, for example,
Levine 1992 or Gillespie 1991).  That is, as
employees learn how to make more pieces
to increase their earnings, they often adjust
the piece rate to capture the gains in pro-
ductivity.  This dynamic of employees im-
proving performance leading to rate re-
ductions is well documented.  It causes
employees to game the system to “make
out.”  Under piece rate systems, gaming the
pay plan often became more important to
workers than getting the job done (Roy
1952; Burawoy 1979).  To defeat the game
of making out, management often makes
the incentive plan more complex, but the
game continues under the new more elabo-
rate rules.  Peer pressure restrains high
performers because high performance may
increase an individual’s earnings, but only
temporarily.  In the longer run, high per-
formance leads to rate reductions, which
disadvantage all employees—hence the
prisoner dilemma quality of piece rates and
commissions.
There are also reasons to question
whether commission pay in service and sales
environments improves organizational per-
formance.  On the one hand, commissions
provide incentives to individuals to sell
more.  On the other hand, shirking under
these plans takes the form of a tendency for
the quality of the service to fall (Pencavel
1977).  In field research for this study, for
example, sales reps reported that they tried
to close a sale to get their commission even
when customers said they would probably
drop the feature after the promotion ended.
Sales reps also reported knowingly selling
to customers who had been recently dis-
connected for failure to pay their bills.  In
addition, individual commission plans un-
dermine the social organization of work
and discourage participation in direct voice
mechanisms such as teams, decreasing joint
problem-solving and sharing of knowledge
and information.  Recent research in call
centers, for example, has shown that both
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service quality and sales are higher where
work organization and group incentives
emphasize team work (Batt 1999; Moynihan
and Batt 2000).  Thus, there is reason to
believe that individual commission plans
not only raise quit rates but also are detri-
mental to service and sales performance
because they undermine group problem-
solving and shared expertise.  While vari-
able pay plans are often adopted because of
the intuitive appeal of paying-for-perfor-
mance, we need more research to under-
stand how different types of plans affect
worker quit rates, the social organization of
work, and organizational performance.
Gender differences also merit some dis-
cussion.  Once occupational and human
resource practices are taken into account,
the female composition of the work force is
associated with lower quit rates (at a mar-
ginally statistically significant level).  This is
consistent with the prior literature as well
as our field research.  Occupational segre-
gation is widespread in this industry, with
women concentrated in the jobs with low
discretion, continuous monitoring, and low
pay.  In our sample, women comprise 56%
of customer service and sales jobs but only
12% of technical jobs.  Within call centers,
they are concentrated in operator services
(80%) and the residential mass market
(60%).  By contrast, service and sales reps
serving business clientele are 55% male.
Thus, it is women’s concentration in lower
occupational titles, rather than gender per
se, that is associated with higher quit rates.
Once occupational differences are taken
into account, women have lower quit rates
than men.
Limitations and Conclusions
There are several limitations to this study.
Because the data were collected at the es-
tablishment unit of analysis, it was not pos-
sible to obtain the kind of individual-level
data that capture variation in human capi-
tal characteristics or in the use of human
resource and dispute resolution procedures
within the establishment.  Moreover, the
cross-sectional nature of the data limits
causal inferences.  It could be, for example,
that high unemployment in some localities
reduces the likelihood of quits, thereby
allowing the adoption of work innovations
such as teams because managers know that
the work force is experienced and stable.
Using unemployment data from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics for each county
where an establishment was located, we
explored this explanation in analyses not
shown, and found no statistically signifi-
cant correlation between local unemploy-
ment and adoption of HR practices.  These
analyses suggest that at least in this indus-
try, adoption is not driven by labor market
conditions.
We believe that our approach to the
question of aggregate quit rates is promis-
ing for a number of reasons.  Our findings
suggest that it is important to disaggregate
the differential influences of alternative
voice mechanisms and human resource
practices on employee quit rates because
they do not appear to have a consistent or
coherent effect.  Quit rates are substan-
tially lower in unionized workplaces than
in nonunion workplaces even in the pres-
ence of a broad set of controls for compen-
sation and a range of human resource prac-
tices.  In addition, both self-directed teams
and off-line problem-solving groups have
strong and statistically significant negative
relationships with quit rates, lending sup-
port to the idea that these mechanisms for
direct participation can provide employees
with enhanced voice in the workplace.  In
contrast, the absence of consistent statisti-
cally significant results for nonunion dis-
pute resolution procedures suggests the
need for further examination of the ques-
tion of what features need to be incorpo-
rated into procedures in order to ensure
that they can serve as effective voice mecha-
nisms that provide employees with alterna-
tives to quitting.  In addition, differences in
the results for nonunion arbitration and
peer review panels provide support for
distinguishing between different types of
nonunion procedure in future research.
Put simply, results based on research on
one type of nonunion procedure may not
hold for other types of procedures.  Among
different types of procedures, peer review
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